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Background
Complex systems integrated for the operation of railways
Complex operational rules used
Systems consist of various sub-systems, some of them are safety-related
High safety requirements for railways
? High-quality components required
? High life cycle costs
New systems often based on structures of existing systems
Existing systems get modified (to fit new requirements, to be employed in 
different environment)
Modifications in complex systems cause high effort for the reassessment 
of the system‘s safety / assessment of the consequences to safety
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Challenge
Reduction of LCC
e.g. for acquisition, operation, maintenance, ...
Increase of Safety
e.g. increase of reliability, decrease of forces
By means of 
Utilization of most suitable components (low-cost ⇔ highly reliable)
Implementation of safety functions
Use of safe rules for operation
? Analysis needed to show the possibilities for optimization
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Approach
Assessment of all elements and communication flows between the 
elements of the system
* here: control technology, not structure / material
Influence from
Environment Sub-system/ element A
Information flow
Information flow
Data storage Information flow
Sub-system
/ element B
Influence on
Environment
System
Computer-supported system analysis for design* and rules
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Method and Tool for Analysis
Method
Assessment of interactions with system environment
Allocation of acceptable risk or similar
Assessment of each sub-system generating interactions with environment
Assessment of information influencing the interactions
Assessment of sub-systems generating the information
Assessment of sensors generating the information
The requirements on the output influence the requirements on the input!
SW Tool SALT
Automatic allocation of safety relevance to each element (sub-system, 
information, sensors, ...)
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Method and Tool for Analysis
How to include rules for human (Instructions on how to act)?
Approach: 
Consider driver as a sub-system receiving and generating information
Validation
Transformation from technical system to written rule and vice versa
PB1 PB2
R1 R2
R2
R1
PB1_active
PB2_active
Lamp_active
&
„If pushbutton 1 is active
and pushbutton 2 is not
active then Lamp active“
Software logicHardware logic Written rule
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Example – Telephone Block Operation
Instructions on how to act
Activity diagram
Functions & Information flow
Sub-systems & Information flow
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Findings of the Example
Information on track occupancy is important
Information on track occupancy is stored twice (train report book in 
offering and accepting train reporting point)
But: Information on track occupancy must be checked only once (when
train shall be offered, but not for acceptance)
In „Instructions on how to act“ the rule for the train acceptance is
umbiguous („accept when no conflict exists“ – but what are the conflicts?)
General findings
Rules must be formulated in a way that it can be checked against
compliance unambiguously ? no fuzzy formulation
Rules must use clearly defined, unambiguously input and output
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Conclusions
The tool presents components and information paths of a system
The tool highlights the safety-related components and information paths
Human involvement and weaknesses in the rules for operation can be
identified
With this knowledge ways to support the staff in its tasks can be
developed
? staff can be relieved from safety-related tasks / replaced by more
reliable systems and deployed in other services
For analysis of further characteristics of the system more attributes can
be assigned to the system elements (e.g. kind of processing unit, 
communication channel, ...)
Computer supported analysis using a database ? Assessment after
modification of system / rules easy; only modified parts have to be
updated
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Thank you for your attention!
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